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INTRODUCTION 
 
Commercial banks produce credit and they provide liquidity.  Credit involves channeling 
resources from entities with excess funds (savers) to entities with a scarcity of funds (investors).  
Many institutions produce credit.  Banks collect savings from depositors and lend the funds to 
firms and households; finance companies collect funds in the commercial paper market and lend 
(or lease) the funds to various investors; insurance companies collect premiums and purchase 
stocks, bonds, commercial paper and other securities. 
Defining liquidity is more difficult.  Brunnemeier and Pederson (2007) contrast ‘funding 
liquidity’ with ‘market liquidity’.  Funding liquidity involves raising cash on short notice.  
Brunnemeier and Pederson model trading in securities markets, so for them funding liquidity 
describes traders’ ability to raise cash with securities as collateral (i.e. margin requirements).  
But the concept is quite general.  When a depositor withdraws cash or a firm borrows from a 
credit line, for example, the issuing bank has supplied funding liquidity to the customer.  Market 
liquidity, in contrast, describes the cost of selling assets.  Market liquidity is high when prices net 
of all transactions costs approximate fundamentals (present values).  Real estate brokers produce 
market liquidity for houses.  Broker-dealers (i.e. investment banks) produce market liquidity for 
stocks, bonds and derivatives, both as underwriters in primary markets and as market makers and 
traders in secondary markets. 
Banks provide both funding liquidity and market liquidity.  Traditional intermediation – 
making illiquid loans funded with liquid deposits – involves production of funding liquidity.  
Like investment banks, commercial banks also provide market liquidity in their role as market 
makers in derivatives markets.  Banks also create market liquidity in loans.  For example, in 
securitization banks transform pools of illiquid loans, such as mortgages or credit card 
 2
receivables, into liquid securities.  Securitization only flourishes in the presence of a deep 
securities market.  Banks’ function in securitization is similar to the function played by 
investment bankers when they underwrite debt and equity for non-financial companies.   
In this paper I consider how banks provide funding liquidity and market liquidity, and 
describe how these roles have evolved.  With provision of both sorts of liquidity, banks face 
unique risks and risk-management challenges.  I discuss how banks meet those challenges.  I 
argue that banks have a special advantage in managing funding liquidity risk but not market 
liquidity risk.  Hence, many institutions provide market liquidity, while banks dominate in 
producing funding liquidity.  Their comparative advantage stems from the structure of bank 
balance sheets as well as their access to government guarantees and central bank liquidity.   
In the end, I argue that liquidity production has always been, and continues to be, the core 
function of banking, but its form has changed in response to development of financial technology 
and deepening of securities markets.  Traditional banks issued liquid deposits to finance illiquid 
loans.  In this ‘old-school’ model, most bank liquidity production came in the form of issuing 
transactions deposits and supporting the payments system.  Modern banks continue to run the 
payments system, but the rise of electronic mechanisms has made this function more efficient 
and reduced the float available to finance lending.  At the same time, securities markets have 
expanded and deepened.  Thus, much of the liquidity production supported by the banking 
system now occurs (in the US) or likely will occur (in developing economies) in support of the 
capital markets.  For example, in the form of off-balance sheet commitments to lend (e.g. lines of 
credit), credit guarantees (e.g. letters of credit), securitization (and the associated implicit support 
from originating banks), and syndicated lending.  These modern roles have changed because 
financial innovations now allow funding to be separated from the information production and 
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financial contracting necessary for credit production.1 
 
FUNDING LIQUIDITY 
Liquidity Production from Deposits 
 
 Banks have traditionally provided funding liquidity to customers by issuing transactions 
deposits that act as a close substitute for currency.  Transactions deposits allow account holders 
to take cash on demand from the bank.  The float from this business - the average balance 
depositors hold in their accounts - can be invested by the bank in loans to businesses and 
households.  Because banks tend to invest in illiquid loans, this business model has been called 
‘asset transformation’ - banks transform illiquid and hence high-yield assets (loans) into liquid 
and thus low-yield assets (deposits).  The yield spread creates positive carry for the bank.  Loans 
are illiquid because banks lend to small and medium-sized businesses without access to broad 
securities market.  To do such lending, banks collect private information on credit risk and future 
growth opportunities and monitor borrowers over the life of the loan. 
 The early theory emphasized how information and monitoring solve financial contracting 
problems in bank lending (e.g., Leland & Pyle, 1977).  As the intermediary, the bank pools funds 
from many small and uninformed depositors and lends on their behalf.  Given the relatively 
limited information of these investors, banks tend to be financed with debt (Townsend, 1979).  
Because banks monitor loans on behalf of depositors, Diamond (1984) argues that they will be 
large and diversified.  This structure minimizes the cost of delegating the monitoring role from 
                                                 
1 This paper will not survey the literature on liquidity and banking.  The literature is a vast, with many hundreds of 
papers focusing on bank runs, contagion and financial crises.  These papers span finance, industrial organization and 
macroeconomics.  It is simply too much to review here.  I will briefly discuss some classic treatments of these 
topics, but will focus most of the discussion on the current state of liquidity production and liquidity risk that we see 
emerging as banks change to keep pace with the development of capital markets. 
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the principal depositor to the agent banker.  Safety and soundness improves the banker’s 
incentives.  So, theory suggests that loans are illiquid because the originating bank has superior 
information to any potential buyer, and that banks are large, well-diversified, and financed 
mainly with debt. 
 In contrast to loans, deposits are low in risk and high in liquidity.  Bank deposits possess 
the three attributes theorists ascribe to money, namely they act as a store of value, they are 
denominated in the economy’s unit of account (e.g. dollars for the U.S.), and they can be used as 
a medium of exchange.  In order for deposits to act as an effective store of value, banks must 
minimize the risk to depositors that their claims will not be honored at face value; hence low risk 
and high liquidity go hand in hand.   
Banks also spend substantial resources to enhance customers’ ability to use deposits as a 
medium of exchange.  For example, demand depositors use checks as a medium of exchange.  In 
recent years, electronic payments technologies offer a cheaper alternative to cash or checks in 
both large and small transactions.  Customers can use debit cards to transfer funds electronically 
from the buyer’s deposit account to the seller’s without losing interest before making the 
payment.  Credit card transactions work similarly, although the buyer maintains more flexibility 
by having the option to borrow funds from the issuing bank.  
Liquidity Production from Loans 
 Banks also produce funding liquidity by issuing lines of credit (sometimes known as 
‘revolvers’ or ‘loan commitments’), which allow customers to receive cash by drawing down the 
line, much as a demand deposit allows customers to take cash at any time.  The difference 
between a demand deposit versus a line of credit - such as a credit card account – is that the line 
is not pre-funded.  Instead, the customer borrows from the bank when they take cash, typically at 
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a pre-arranged rate of interest.  Households use unsecured lines in the form of credit card 
accounts and secured lines in the form of home-equity lines.  Businesses typically also receive 
liquidity from banks in the form of credit lines. 
 The appeal of lines of credit has been studied theoretically from the stand point of 
businesses.  For example, credit lines mitigate the risk of credit rationing for businesses during 
downturns (Berger & Udell, 1992; Morgan, 1998), and they insure firms against shocks to 
demand for capital (Holmstrom & Tirole, 1997).  Firms can also use cash, but Sufi (2007) shows 
that firms with high cash flow use bank lines as a cheaper source of liquidity.  Firms with low 
cash flow are unable to access bank liquidity on good terms and as a result hold cash instead.  
Sufi also finds that firms without bank lines adjust their buffer cash to changes in cash flow, 
while firms with access to bank lines do not.  Together these results suggest that bank lines 
mitigate liquidity constraints on firms by providing them access to capital when investment 
opportunities improve (Almeida, Campello and Weisbach, 2004). 
What explains the traditional model of banking? 
Why combine liquid deposits with illiquid loans and credit lines?  There have been many 
attempts to understand this traditional structure of banks.  Some explanations suggest a causal 
chain running from liquid deposit to illiquid lending; some emphasize a chain of logic running 
from illiquid loans to liquid deposits; a third set emphasize a true synergy in which the causality 
goes in both directions. 
Liquid Deposits Î Illiquid Loans 
One simple explanation for bank balance sheets stems from government deposit 
insurance.  With insurance, deposits are safe, regardless of the bank’s investment and financing 
decisions.  Claims against banks are thus a close substitute for claims against the government and 
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are an equally good store of value.  Banks can invest in safe and liquid assets - they can be 
structured as narrow banks - or they can invest in higher yielding risky assets like loans.  That 
decision does not matter to a fully insured depositor.  With limited liability, bank shareholders 
receive the upside but have limited downside and benefit from risky, high-yield assets.  Thus, the 
‘moral hazard’ from deposit insurance encourages banks to invest in risky assets like loans and 
may play some role in explaining bank structure.  Explicit deposit insurance schemes have 
become common worldwide.  As of 1999, for example, 99 countries had created such programs 
(Kane and Demirguc-Kunt, 2002).  
 Kane and Demiurgic-Kunt also show that deposit insurance was absent in most countries 
before the 1960s.  Implicit insurance can also induce risk-shifting behavior, but history suggests 
that the structure of banking pre-dates active involvement by governments.  Much theory 
attempts to explain the economics of combining illiquid loans with liquid deposits absent 
government guarantees.  Fama (1985) argues that banks have a comparative advantage in 
information production flowing from their role managing the payments system.  Imagine a bank 
providing payments services to a small business.  Each day the small business makes and 
receives payments, both in the form of checks as well as currency.  These payment flows reflect 
the current state of business, and if the small firm uses one bank, this bank has the opportunity to 
know before others if the firm is having problems.  Such private information could explain why 
the bank can lend on better terms than other competing intermediaries. 
Some evidence suggests that banks do have an information advantage stemming from 
deposits.  Small firms concentrate their borrowing with a single financial service firm, and these 
firms usually borrow from commercial banks.  More than 80 percent of borrowing from financial 
institutions comes from commercial banks, and most borrowing comes from lenders where firms 
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have a deposit account (Petersen and Rajan, 1994).  In two bank case studies, Mester, Nakamura 
and Renault (2006) and Norden and Weber (2007) find that changes in checking account 
balances help banks monitor small businesses.  Similarly, Udell (2004) finds that finance 
companies that lend with account receivable as collateral sometimes require borrowers to set up 
a special checking account to take payment on the receivables, thus potentially providing the 
finance company with the same information flows available to banks.  
 Loan pricing and credit availability, however, do not seem lower for those borrowing 
from the bank that holds their checking account.  Cole (1998), for example, finds no link 
between the presence of a checking account and the probability that a firm will be granted credit 
from a bank.  Cole, Goldberg and White (2004) find that for small firms applying to borrow from 
small banks, the likelihood of approval increases with the presence of a deposit relationship but 
no such result is evident when small firms borrow from large banks.  Petersen and Rajan (1994) 
find no relationship between borrower deposits and the interest rate charged (holding constant 
the length of the bank-borrower relationship).  Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein (2005) 
find no link between the presence of a checking account and the fraction of trade credit paid late, 
a measure of credit availability to the firm. 
   Beyond information, transaction deposits may be supplied inelastically with respect to 
market interest rates, thereby allowing banks to insure borrowers against credit shocks.  Berlin 
and Mester (1999) present a model in which bank core deposits allow them to insure borrowers 
against credit shocks, whereas an intermediary funded with, say, commercial paper, would not be 
able to offer this insurance.  Borrowers value this contract either because they are risk averse or 
because they face costly financial distress.  Thus, the deposit franchise may give banks an 
advantage in lending that is unrelated to information.  As evidence, Berlin and Mester show that 
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interest rates on bank loans are less sensitive to economy-wide credit shocks (e.g. corporate bond 
spreads, changes in unemployment, etc) when the originating bank holds more core deposits 
(defined as deposits under $100,000). 
 Myers and Rajan (1998) argue that because banks are funded with very liquid debt and 
have such high leverage, they need to some hold illiquid assets to mitigate the risk of 
expropriation or fraud.  It is simply too easy for banker to “steal” when assets are highly liquid.  
In a sense, their model argues against the “narrow bank” in which deposits are backed 100 
percent by low-risk and highly liquid government securities.  Too much liquidity on the asset 
side is dangerous because it becomes too easy for funds to be expropriated quickly.  Although 
not an empirical article, Myers and Rajan argue that the historical development of commercial 
banking supports their model.  Banks historically emerged as payments-providers only; the bank 
began as a ‘money-changer’.  These money changers held high levels of reserves, and the main 
risk perceived at the time had to do with fraud rather than bank runs.  Myers and Rajan argue that 
the money-changers enhanced their reputation for honesty by engaging in lending in the local 
community, hence the origin of asset transformation. 
Illiquid Loans Î Liquid Deposits 
 Several recent theories argue that the structure of bank lending shapes the nature of their 
liability structure.  These arguments reverse the causal chain but lead to the same main 
implication, which is that illiquid loans go together with liquid deposits.  For example, Calomiris 
and Kahn (1991) and Diamond and Rajan (2001) argue that demandable-deposits, by making the 
bank vulnerable to a destructive run, improve incentives for monitoring loans.  Similarly, 
Flannery (1994) argues that very short term maturity of deposits improves bank incentives; for 
example, asset substitution problems are contained by short debt maturity.  Moreover, Calomiris 
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and Kahn emphasize that the “sequential service constraint”, whereby deposits are paid on a 
first-come, first-served basis, strengthens monitoring incentives for informed depositors.  Thus, 
the nature of the bank loan portfolio shapes the structure of its deposits. 
Illiquid Loans Í Î Liquid Deposits 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) argue that the liquid deposit account offered through a 
financial intermediary fosters households insurance against liquidity risk and fosters 
consumption smoothing.  In their model, a bank is a mechanism to allow investors to finance 
illiquid but high return projects while insuring against unpredictable early-period consumption 
demands through pooling.  The cost of this arrangement is the possibility of a bank run.  While 
this model does not suggest a true synergy between lending and deposits, it does begin to 
consider links between the two sides of the banking business. 
Recent studies suggest that by combining exposure to liquidity risk in both deposit-taking 
and lending yields a risk-reducing synergy.  Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2002) argue that as long 
as liquidity demands from depositors and borrowers off lines of credit are not too correlated, an 
intermediary reduces its cash buffer by serving both customers.  Holding cash raises costs for 
both agency and tax reasons.  Thus, their model yields a diversification synergy between 
transactions deposits and unused loan commitments.  Gatev, Schuermann and Strahan (2007) 
show that bank stock-return volatility increases with both transactions deposits and unused loan 
commitments, but that volatility declines when banks are exposed to liquidity on both sides of 
the balance sheet.  Thus, there seems to be a hedge associated with combining these two 
activities. 
Gatev and Strahan (2006) suggest a stronger hypothesis than Kashyap et al, arguing that 
liquidity demands may be negatively correlated during episodes of ‘flight to quality’.  Funds tend 
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to flow into bank transactions deposits during such episodes.  At the same time, demands from 
borrowers for liquidity from credit lines also increase then because of lack of liquidity in 
commercial paper and bond markets.  Why do banks enjoy funding inflows when liquidity dries 
up?  First, the banking system has explicit guarantees of its liabilities.  Second, banks have 
access to emergency liquidity from the central bank.  Third, large banks such as Continental 
Illinois have been supported in the face of financial distress (O’Hara and Shaw, 1990).  Thus, 
funding inflows occur because banks are rationally viewed as a safe haven for funds.  Consistent 
with this notion, Pennacchi (2006) finds that during the years before federal deposit insurance, 
bank funding supply did not increase when spreads tightened. 
Sources of Funding Liquidity Risk 
 By it very nature, providing funding liquidity makes (non-narrow) banks unstable 
because they are in the position of promising to disgorge cash on demand.  Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983) present the classic treatment of liquidity risk from traditional asset transformation.  Under 
normal circumstances the bank can meet random liquidity demands from depositors, but the 
structure is vulnerable to a run based on depositors’ expectation that other depositors will run.  In 
other words, runs can occur with no basis in fundamentals.  Forced early liquidation lowers value 
and so runs are costly.  This bank-run scenario presents the classic rationale for government 
provision of deposit insurance and back-up liquidity from central banks because these safety nets 
eliminate the incentive to run based on depositor expectations that others may run.  The safety 
net, however, creates a host of other incentive and implementation problems (see Chapters 26 & 
27 in this volume). 
 The empirical evidence suggests that expectations-based runs are the exception rather 
than the rule.  Gorton (1988) studies seven banking panics in the United States prior to the 
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creation of the Federal Reserve and finds that in all seven cases rational concerns about solvency 
motivated depositors.  Under such circumstances, runs may cripple even healthy banks if 
depositors can not distinguish solvent from insolvent banks.  Gorton also finds, however, that the 
economic shocks preceding the banking panics during the Depression were not sufficiently large 
to justify the scale of the subsequent runs.  Thus, changes in depositor expectations may have 
exacerbated the severity of bank runs above what one might normally expect.  Calomiris and 
Mason (1997) study a specific run on Chicago banks in 1932 and also find no evidence that 
solvent banks failed because of runs.   
More recently, McCandless, Gabrielli and Rouillet (2003) study runs faced by banks in 
Argentina in 2001 and, consistent with the studies of the U.S., find that solvency concerns were 
at the root of the runs.  Puri and Iyer (2007) used detailed depositor-level data from a single 
Indian bank that experienced a run triggered by the insolvency of a large cooperative bank 
invested heavily in securities-based lending.  Sharp declines in stock prices in 2001 led to the 
panic, but the individual bank studied appears to have been solvent.  The study finds that 
depositors with a longer history with the distressed bank, depositors that also borrow from the 
bank, and depositors from the majority ethnic groups were less likely to run than other account 
holders.  Relationships between banks and depositors seem to mitigate liquidity risk. 
Loss of funding from runs can spill over and constrain bank production of credit.  
Bernanke (1983) argued, for example, that bank failures reduced credit supply and worsened the 
U.S. depression during the 1930s.  Many subsequent studies have tested how bank insolvency or 
monetary policy changes affect credit, but several recent studies have found that pure liquidity 
shocks can also alter credit.  Khwaja and Mian (2005) study bank lending following runs on 
dollar-denominated deposits that occurred in the wake of Pakistan’s unexpected nuclear test in 
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1998.  They exploit variation in the magnitude of the liquidity shock across banks (from different 
levels of dollar deposits), and show that borrowers substituted away from banks experiencing 
greater runs and toward banks experiencing smaller runs (or no runs).  Paravisini (2007) exploits 
the opposite kind of shock – an injection of liquidity by the Argentine government - and finds 
that profitable lending expanded following the liquidity infusion.  
 Banking panics and failures dropped to near zero in U.S. banks from the creation of the 
FDIC in 1934 until the late 1970s.  This stability ended in the 1980s, but most of the failures 
have been from investments in high-risk loans (e.g. Continental Illinois in business lending; 
Bank of New England in high-risk commercial real estate), or in the case of savings institutions 
in taking on interest rate risk.  In some cases banks faced funding outflows, but for the most part 
instability had little to do with liquidity risk from depositors.  For example, large, uninsured 
depositors began removing funds from Continental Illinois in response to large credit losses on 
business lending.  Very recently, depositors at the UK bank Northern Rock and the US bank 
Countrywide ran because of solvency concerns - losses on securities backed by troubled sub-
prime mortgages. 
 Bank exposure to funding liquidity risk also arises from issuance of lines of credit, which 
commit the bank to provide cash on demand.  Much of the day-to-day variation in liquidity risk 
is managed by diversification across a large base of customers.  Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2002) 
argue that diversification benefits across broad classes of customers – specifically borrowers off 
lines of credit and demand depositors – can reduce risk and the need to hold cash.  As evidence, 
they report that banks dominate the market for lines of credit and, among banks, those with high 
transactions deposits issue more credit lines.  Gatev, Schuermann and Strahan (2007) show that 
stock-return volatility is lower at banks exposed to liquidity risk in both lines of credit and 
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deposits, suggesting a powerful hedge associated with combining these two products. 
Several studies explore why firms and households draw funds from credit lines.  
Aggarwal, Ambrose and Lin (2005) find that individuals draw more funds from home equity 
lines when their credit quality declines.  Using data on Spanish firms, Jimenez, Lopez and 
Saurina (2007) find that usage rates on credit lines increase as firms near bankruptcy.  These 
studies suggest that ex post demand for liquidity increases as a borrower’s credit quality 
deteriorates, but other studies suggest that bank ex ante supply of lines offsets this risk.  Banks 
restrict access to lines for poor credit quality firms and households.  For example, Gropp, Schulz 
and White (1997) show that total supply of credit to households is lower in states with large 
housing exemption, and that this reduction restricts access to low-income, high-default risk 
customers.  Sufi (2007) finds that large public firms with low cash flow have less access to 
liquidity from bank lines and thus hold more balance-sheet cash.  Similarly, Agarwal (2004) 
finds that riskier private firms have both less access to credit lines and lower utilization rates than 
safer firms, and Agarwal et al (2006) compare home equity lines with second mortgages (home 
equity loans) and finds greater default risk in the second category of ‘spot loans’. 
Managing Funding Liquidity Risk 
 Banks use several tools to manage funding liquidity exposures.  First, they hold liquid 
assets – cash, securities, and loans that may be sold easily.  Second, they have access to liquidity 
from other banks in the inter-bank market.  Third, they have liquidity support from the Central 
Bank.  And, fourth, they are funded with deposits that expand during periods of market 
uncertainty.2 
                                                 
2 Banks also face similar liquidity risk management problem in balancing high frequency payments during daylight 
hours.  The Federal Reserve provides intraday credit to help grease the wheels of the payments system.  The funding 
liquidity risk discussed here involves somewhat longer-lived risks of loss of funding sources beyond a single day. 
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 Holding cash is a simple yet costly way to bear liquidity risk.  Banks have no particular 
advantage in bearing risk this way.  Cash is costly because it earns a low return, is tax inefficient, 
and may be easily diverted or misallocated (Jensen, 1986).  Nevertheless, during the early part of 
the 20th century banks used cash to persuade depositors of their soundness.  A.P. Giannini, the 
founder of what is now the Bank of America, famously withstood runs during the panic of 1906 
by displaying gold reserves on the street front, and offering to convert deposits into gold to all 
comers.  This show of strength calmed his depositors while many competing banks failed.  
Modern evidence also suggests that cash and liquid assets, as well as loans that can potentially be 
sold or securitized, act as a buffer for banks against funding shocks (e.g. Kashyap and Stein, 
2000; Loutskina, 2005). 
 Banks second layer of support comes from borrowing and lending in the interbank 
market.  While not a source of aggregate liquidity, interbank markets can recycle liquidity 
through the system.  Typically large banks have greater access to inter-bank credit than small 
ones.  Ashcraft, McAndrews and Skeie (2007) find that small U.S. banks hold larger cash buffers 
and excess reserves with the Federal Reserve than large banks, and that they supply funds to 
large banks in the Federal Funds market.   
Even with such access, a key issue for large banks is how well this market functions 
during periods of market stress.  Allen and Gale (2000) show theoretically how interbank 
connections can lead to contagion of liquidity shortages from one part of the banking system to 
others.  Furfine (2002) studies the Fed Funds market during the LTCM crisis and finds that 
LTCM-exposed banks continued to have access to borrowing during this period.  During the 
summer of 2007, however, spreads in the LIBOR market increased to about 50 basis points 
above rates in the Fed Funds market as investors appeared to lose confidence in their ability to 
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evaluate the risks of large European banks with potential exposure to losses in the U.S. sub-
prime mortgages market (Kane, 2007). 
 The third source of liquidity for banks is from the Central Bank, the ‘lender of last 
resort’.  According to Bagehot (1873), central banks should lend to illiquid but solvent banks at a 
penalty rate.  Some have argued that such targeted liquidity support may worsen moral hazard 
problems associated with bailouts.  Instead, open market operations that expand the total supply 
of liquidity are preferable.  Such broad expansions of liquidity can be recycled in the interbank 
lending market without (or with less) moral hazard (e.g. Goodfriend and King, 1988).  
Coordination failures may occur in the interbank market, however, whereby banks hoard 
liquidity because of concern about counterparty solvency (e.g. Rochet and Vives, 2004).  Such 
coordination failures worry policymakers, who often intervene to overcome them.  Examples 
include the 1987 stock market crash, when commercial banks were encouraged to lend by the 
Federal Reserve to distressed investment banks; the reorganization of LTCM in 1998, where 
counterparties were discouraged from forcibly liquidating the hedge fund; the temporary freezing 
up in the wholesale payments system following 9/11/01, when Federal Reserve officials not only 
injected liquidity through open market operations and direct lending to banks, but also implored 
banks to resume making payments to restore the normal patterns of payment coordination 
(McAndrews and Potter, 2002); and the summer of 2007, when the Federal Reserve explicitly 
encouraged banks to borrow from the discount window to assure markets that liquidity support 
would be offered if necessary. 
Combining exposure to funding liquidity on both the asset and liability sides of the 
balance sheet provides the fourth measure of liquidity stability for banks.  First, as noted above 
Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2002) argue that demands for funding liquidity by borrowers and 
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depositors tends to be less than perfectly correlated, so combining the two products offers some 
diversification benefits.  Moreover, Saidenberg and Strahan (2000) study the LTCM crisis during 
1998 and find that bank lending increased to satisfy a systematic increase in loan demand from 
firms that normally receive liquidity in the commercial paper market, but that this increase in 
liquidity demand from borrowers was offset by funding inflows by depositors.  Gatev and 
Strahan (2006) study these flows across many market conditions and find that both bank loans 
and their holding of cash and securities increase when market liquidity dries up generally (as 
proxied by the commercial paper-T-bill spread). 
 So, recent evidence suggests that by offering liquidity from lines of credit, bank expose 
themselves to the systematic risk that they may face loan take downs across many borrowers at 
the same time.  Bearing this risk requires access to funds at exactly the time that most firms find 
borrowing expensive.  Banks enjoy an increase in funding supply at exactly such times because 
they are viewed as a safe haven for funds.  For example, during the 1998 liquidity crisis, banks 
experienced funding inflows into transactions deposit accounts, and banks with larger transaction 
deposit bases prior to the shock received the greatest inflows.  Since banks tend to combine these 
two products, flows into the bank deposit accounts tended to balance outflows of funds from 
unused lines of credit (Gatev, Schuermann and Strahan, 2006). 
Empirical Trends in Funding Liquidity 
 The importance of funding liquidity produced through deposits seems to be falling 
consistently over time, as shown graphically in Figure 1.  The decline in the ratio of transactions 
deposits to GDP has occurred as banks have increasingly offered customers money-like services 
via electronic technologies.  Similar trends are evident in plotting the ratio of M1, which also 
includes currency, to GDP.  The secular decline in ‘money demand’ reflects better payments 
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technologies that allow households to make payments without losing interest on their savings.  
For example, credit card payments’ share rose consistently since 1980.  Debit card usage 
remained very small (around 2% or less) until the middle of the 1990s, and then rose sharply to 
about 20 percent of all payments by 2006. 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Figure 1 also shows that the drop in transaction deposits has been more than offset by the 
growth in unused credit lines.  All kinds of lines – lines to consumers (mainly home equity lines 
and credit cards) and business lines - have grown relative to GDP over the past 20 years, in 
contrast to the declining ratio of transaction deposits to GDP.  Lines to households have grown 
most dramatically, from about 10 percent of GDP in the early 1990s to more the 30 percent by 
2006, more than offsetting the decline in transactions deposits to GDP.  Moreover, the total 
amount of liquidity provision by the banking system as a whole has grown.  Thus, while the 
composition of banks provision of funding liquidity has changed, it remains as important as ever 
(Berger and Bouwman, 2007). 
 
MARKET LIQUIDITY 
Many of the changes in banking over the past twenty years reflect moving from a model 
of ‘originate and hold’ to one of ‘originate and sell.’  The first model involved creation of 
funding liquidity through asset transformation from loans to deposits.  This traditional model has 
been reshaped by the growth of loan sales and securitization.  In the modern approach, the bank 
creates market liquidity rather than funding liquidity; that is, the bank (or other intermediary) 
transforms a hard-to-sell asset like a loan into one that is easier to sell, like a bond or other 
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security.  This allows the originating bank to sell the asset to passive investors and re-cycle their 
capital to originate new loans, which can in turn be transformed and sold. 
Securitization 
Banks have increasingly used securitization to finance their lending by creating structures 
such as collateralized loan, mortgage and debt obligations (CDOs, CLOs, CMOs and, generically 
SIVs, or structured investment vehicles).  These financing arrangements allow the originating 
bank to remove business loans, credit card loans and mortgages from the balance sheet.  
Securitization involves pooling the cash flows from a number of similar assets and selling the 
pool to a separate legal entity known as a special purpose vehicle (SPV).  The SPV purchases 
those cash flows from the proceeds of the sale of securities, such as bonds or commercial paper.  
The securities are sold to arm’s-length investors like insurance companies and money market 
mutual funds.  Rather than holding the asset on a balance sheet financed with liquid deposits (the 
traditional model of asset transformation), securitization transforms the asset itself from an 
illiquid one (pools of loans) into a liquid securities issued by the SPV (bonds and commercial 
paper).   
The pooling process results in a diversified portfolio of cash flows, which are used to 
support payments on debt securities issued by the SPV.  Creating the separate SPV isolates the 
cash-flow generating assets and/or collateral so that securities issued by the SPV are not a 
general claim against the issuer, just against those assets.  Cash flows from the original pool of 
loans can be further stripped and repackaged based on various characteristics (e.g., the 
prepayment behavior or payment priority) to enhance their liquidity.  Often, the cash flows come 
with some additional implicit or explicit guarantees from the originating financial institution.  
For example, the originator may retain the residual or equity tranche in the SPV, thus retaining 
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most of the credit risk.  Originating banks also will often issue backup liquidity when SPV 
funding comes from short-term sources such as commercial paper.  The backup liquidity may be 
necessary if the SPV has trouble rolling over the commercial paper, as occurred during the 
summer of 2007.  In cases like this, there is no clean separation between the bank’s production of 
funding and market liquidity because without the backup liquidity (i.e. the funding liquidity), the 
securitization would probably not be possible. 
Securitization is attractive to banks (as well as to non-financial firms) because it lowers 
the total cost of financing loans.  One benefit of securitization is that it avoids bankruptcy costs.  
In contrast to normal debt finance, owners of the SPV-issued debt have no claim against the 
originator’s other assets if the originator files for bankruptcy (Ayotte and Gaon, 2006).  
Moreover, the SPV itself can not go bankrupt, although defaults on the underlying loans can 
create losses for bondholders.  This is accomplished contractually by forcing early amortization 
of the bonds issued by the SPV if cash flows from the underlying assets are lower than expected.  
With no possibility of default on the bonds, no claim against the originator when cash flows are 
low, and no decisions to be made by the SPV itself, the bonds sold by the SPV have side stepped 
both the agency costs of financial distress as well as direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy 
(Gorton and Souleles, 2006). 
While early amortization avoids financial distress cost, it does impose losses on 
bondholders.  Thus, buyers of bonds created through securitization face a potential lemons 
problem because originators have better information and may be tempted to securitize their low-
quality loans (Akerlof, 1970).  If the lemons problem were not solved in some manner, 
securitization would fail to lower the costs of finance.  Demarzo (2005) shows how pooling and 
tranching can reduce the lemons problem by allowing the SPV to fund most of the purchase of 
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the original assets with very safe bonds issued by the SPV.  In a typical structure, the SPV will 
issue senior notes with a high rating (say AA), a mezzanine tranche with a lower rating (say BB), 
and an equity tranche that is unrated.  Both the senior and mezzanine tranches are liquid and held 
by various sorts of institutional investors; only a small piece of the financing – the equity tranche 
– remains illiquid.  The equity tranche bears all of the losses (unless losses fully deplete this 
tranche), and is typically held by the originator (Franke and Krahnen, 2004) or the master or 
special servicer (Sanders, 2004).  Thus, most of the credit risk is concentrated in the equity 
tranche; because the originator holds this tranche, their incentive to place lemons in the pool is 
reduced.  Moreover, the originator typically continues to collect payments and pass these 
payments to the SPV.  Again, holding the first loss also improve incentives to monitor the assets 
to minimize losses on this riskiest tranche.   
To reduce the risk of early amortization further, there have been a number of documented 
instances in which originating financial institutions voluntarily enhanced the cash flows to the 
SPV (and thus reduced losses to security holders) to preserve their reputation in the market (e.g. 
Calomiris and Mason, 2002 and Higgins and Mason, 2004).  In 2007, several large banks 
repurchased billion in assets that had been securitized in SIVs.  Gorton and Souleles (2006) show 
that the pricing of bonds issued by the SPV reflect not only the quality of assets in the pool but 
also the rating of the issuer, suggesting that investors value implicit support for unexpectedly low 
cash flows. 
Securitization also enhances liquidity by creating classes of assets with risk 
characteristics suitable to different clienteles.  For example, insurance companies may be the 
natural clientele for the most senior tranches, while hedge funds with either a strong appetite for 
risk or superior credit-risk management models may be the natural clientele for the subordinated 
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tranches.  Mortgage securitizations are often tranched according to prepayment risk.  Again, this 
kind of structure allows specialists in pre-payment risk to earn returns on their expertise by 
concentrating that risk in one class of securities. 
Securitization of mortgages has grown most dramatically in the United States, in large 
part because of subsidies from Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) - The Federal 
National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(Freddie Mac).  Fannie Mae was created by the U.S. Congress in 1934 to promote access to 
mortgage credit for low and moderate-income household.  During its first three decades, Fannie 
Mae was operated as a government agency that purchased mainly mortgages insured by the 
Federal Housing Authority (FHA).  In 1968, Fannie Mae became a public corporation; its role in 
purchasing FHA mortgages (as well as mortgages insured by the Veteran’s Administration) was 
taken over by a new government agency, the Government National Mortgage Association 
(GNMA).  Freddie Mac was chartered by Congress in 1970 to provide stability and liquidity to 
the market for residential mortgages, focusing mainly on mortgages originated by savings 
institutions.  Freddie Mac was privatized in 1986. 
By the 1990s, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were heavy buyers of mortgages from 
all types of lenders, with the aim of holding some of those loans and securitizing the rest. 
Together they have played the dominant role in fostering the development of the secondary 
market.  As shown by Frame and White (2005), the GSEs combined market share has grown 
rapidly since the early 1980s.  In 1990 about 25% of the $2.9 trillion in outstanding mortgages 
were either purchased and held or purchased and securitized by the two major GSEs.  By 2003, 
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this market share had increased to 47%.3  GSE access to implicit government support allows 
them to borrow at rates below those available to private banks.  Passmore, Sherlund and 
Burgess (2005) argue that most (but not all) of the benefits of GSE subsidized borrowing 
benefits their shareholders rather than mortgage borrowers.  To take advantage this subsidy, 
during the 1990s the GSEs increasingly opted to hold, rather than securitize, many of the 
mortgages that they buy.  Policymakers have become concerned about the resulting expansion of 
interest rate risk at the GSEs (Greenspan, 2004).   
Despite the policy concerns, the GSEs do enhance mortgage liquidity either by buying 
and holding mortgages or by securitizing them.  The GSEs operate under a special charter, 
however, limiting the size of mortgages that they may purchase or securitize.  Today, the GSEs 
may only purchase ‘non-jumbo’ mortgages, defined in 2006 as those below $417,000 for loans 
secured by single-family homes.  The loan limit, first set at $93,750 in 1980, increases each year 
by the percentage change in the national average of one-family housing prices, based on a survey 
of major lenders by the Federal Housing Finance Board.  Loutskina and Strahan (2007) show 
that bank supply of mortgages to the jumbo market are constrained by their liquidity and cost of 
funds, whereas there are no such supply constraints to the non-jumbo market because banks have 
the low-cost option of selling those mortgages to the GSEs. 
Loan sales and syndication 
Banks also create market liquidity in loan syndication and in secondary market trading of 
loans.  Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) describe how adverse selection and moral hazard dampen 
the liquidity of loans.  They argue that loan sales took off in 1980s because banks learned to sell 
                                                 
3  GNMA provides a very important source of mortgage finance to low-income borrowers, holding or securitizing 
about 10% of all mortgages outstanding. 
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only a portion of loans and began to offer implicit guarantees to buyers (e.g. promises to buy 
back troubled loans).4  As a result, loan sales grew from $27 billion in 1983 to $291 billion by 
1989.  Loan syndication, which grew dramatically during the 1990s, works much the same as 
loan sales.  In these structures financial institutions lend as a group at the outset, with one bank 
taking the lead in contracting with the borrower. 
Loan sales and syndication differ from securitization mainly in the scale of loans 
considered.  Loan sales involve large loans while securitization achieves sufficient scale by 
pooling of many small loans.  But the fundamental contracting problems - asymmetric 
information and moral hazard - are basically the same.  In loan syndication, a lead bank has the 
primary responsibility for negotiation with the borrower, writing contracts, pricing the loan, and 
setting the non-price terms (e.g. covenants).  The lead bank also manages the relationship over 
time.  The lead bank will often guarantee a commitment amount to the borrower, and then sell 
pieces of the loan to participant banks.  The participant banks thus help fund the loan but are less 
involved in the relationship on a day-to-day basis.  Lead banks thus typically have better 
information than participants, so there is a potential lemons problem similar to the one described 
earlier about securitization.   
As with securitization, the contracting problem in loan sales and syndication is solved in 
part through incentives and in part though the lead-bank’s reputation.  Lead banks generally 
retain the largest share of syndicated loans, which helps mitigate the information problem faced 
by less-informed participants.  Both the lead-bank’s share and the concentration of the syndicate 
increase with borrower opacity (Dennis & Mullineaux, 2000; Lee & Mullineaux, 2004; Jones, 
                                                 
4  Such guarantees undermined the spirit of bank capital requirements and have been a concern to bank supervisors. 
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Lang and Nigro, 2005; and Sufi, 2007).  Moreover,  Ivashina (2006) shows that the incentive 
problems built into a syndicate are priced into the yield. 
Syndication itself is a kind of liquidity production on the part of the lead bank, similar 
conceptually to bond underwriter.  Since 1995, many cases of loan syndications have also 
received ratings from Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, just as bonds do.  In contrast to bonds 
underwritten by investment banks, however, lead banks are more actively involved in 
maintaining a relationship with the borrower after syndication.  And, as we have seen, the lead 
bank invariably retains a stake in the loan, again in contrast to the case of bond underwriting. 
In recent years, participation in syndicated loans has become increasingly liquid as 
secondary market trading has flourished.  Güner (2006) finds that yields on loans issued by 
banks that actively sell loans tend to be lower than other loans, consistent with the idea that 
liquidity reduces the yield required to compensate lenders.  Wittenberg-Moerman (2006) finds 
that bid-ask spreads are higher when borrowers are more opaque (e.g. unrated, private firms v. 
rated, public firms), consistent with private information reducing liquidity.  She also finds, 
however, that loans originated by lead arrangers with greater market share trade at lower spreads.  
This result echoes studies of securitization, providing further evidence that banks enhance 
liquidity not only with explicit contracting and credit guarantees but also with their reputation 
(e.g. through implicit guarantees or recourse). 
Much of the secondary market trading occurs as a means for non-bank investors to enter 
the syndicated lending market.  Term loans trade much more than credit lines because non-bank 
institutional investors do not want the funding risk.  Drucker and Puri (2005) study the 
emergence of secondary market trading volume in syndicated loans, which has grown from 
nearly nothing in 1990 to about $180 billion in 2006.  They find that loans with more restrictive 
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covenants are more likely to trade because covenants provide assurances to buyers that they will 
have sufficiently strong control rights to protect their investment.  In this case, control rights 
seem to act as an alternative to information in enhancing liquidity.  Their results are surprising 
because most public debt, which continues to trade more than bank loans, comes with much 
looser covenants than what is seen in the typical syndicated loan.  Overall, however, this paper 
suggests that information asymmetry between bank lenders and potential buyers continue to 
dampen liquidity.  For example, in their sample sold loans are rated 88% of the time, compared 
to just 39% for loans that have no secondary market liquidity. 
So, banks provide market liquidity when they repackage loans via securitization, when 
they trade loans, and when they act as lead arrangers in loan syndication.  In all three cases the 
asymmetric information creates a barrier to liquidity.  To overcome this barrier, banks expose 
themselves to risk - in the case of loan securitization by taking the first losses and in the 
syndicated lending context by holding the largest share of the loan.  In many cases originating 
banks also provide implicit guarantees.  Reputation in the market mitigates shirking incentives, 
and helps explain why large, well capitalized banks tend to dominate as lead arrangers (Gatev 
and Strahan, 2007). 
Sources of Market Liquidity Risk 
Market liquidity risk occurs if banks lose the ability to sell or securitize loans at fair 
prices.  Under such circumstances, market liquidity risk feeds back to funding liquidity if the 
bank must raise funds on short notice in order to hold those assets on their balance sheet. 
 Producing market liquidity requires banks to bear enough risk to maintain incentives to 
deal responsibly with the borrower in setting prices and enforcing covenants.  Loan syndication 
also exposes lead banks to ‘underwriter risk’, similar to the risk born by securities underwriters 
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offering firm commitments to debt and equity issuers.  In the case of syndicated lending, if 
demand from participant banks is lower than expected, the lead arranger must either fund more 
of the loan than anticipated or the deal may fail to close.5  Both outcomes are costly for the lead 
bank.  The first option would require the bank to have additional debt and equity capital; the 
second would be harmful to the lead bank’s reputation. 
Securitization also often comes with not only credit guarantees of various kinds but also 
liquidity support.  For example, asset-backed commercial paper structures usually come with a 
liquidity backstop facility issued by the bank that set up the securitization.  These facilities 
expose banks to funding liquidity risk as described above, but the facilities are necessary to 
create the securitization in the first place.  Many of these kinds of structures could not re-finance 
their commercial paper market during the credit crunch of 2007 and required banks to replace 
that financing to avoid default.  In such cases, there is no bright line between market liquidity 
and finding liquidity. 
Empirical Trends in Market Liquidity 
Figure 2 illustrates the growing quantitative importance of loan securitization for 
different types of loans over time.  In 1976, there was no securitization of commercial 
mortgages, business loans (commercial and industrial, or C&I, loans) or consumer loans.  By the 
end of 2003, $294 billion of commercial mortgages were securitized, $104 billion worth of C&I 
loans were securitized, along with $658 billion worth of consumer loans.  But the really 
explosive growth has occurred in the market for home mortgages:  In 1976, the amount of 
                                                 
5 While most loan syndicates are arranged under a firm commitment between the bank and the borrower (opposed to 
‘best efforts’ where borrowers bear all of the risk of the issue failing), some syndicated loans have been arranged 
under market-flex contracts whereby the pricing of a loan may not be guaranteed by the lead bank (Standard & 
Poor’s, 2006).  These kinds of arrangements shift some of the underwriting risk from the lead arranger(s) to the 
issuer. 
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securitized home mortgages was $28 billion; by the end of 2003 the total amount of securitized 
home mortgages had grown almost 150 times, reaching $4.2 trillion.  Over the same period, the 
amount of home mortgages outstanding grew from $489 billion to $7.3 trillion. 
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 Unlike the United States, securitization has not been spurred elsewhere by government 
enterprises – there are no institutions analogous to the GSEs in Europe.  Nevertheless, 
securitization has taken root there as private banks have begun to tap into markets to fund 
various kinds of loans.  Table 1 reports the rate of securitization issuance for new loans between 
2000 and 2006, and by collateral type in 2005.  The figures show rapid growth overall.  For 
example, between 2000 and 2006 securitization origination rates soared by more than 35% per 
year in Europe; in contrast, based on growth in outstandings, securitization in the U.S. rose by 
only about 9% per year over the same period.  Securitization of residential mortgage-backed 
securities grew fastest in Europe, by almost 70% between 2005 and 2006.  Moreover, as in the 
U.S., securitization of loans backed by real estate – both residential and commercial - seem to 
be taking the lead, comprising about 56% of total securitization in 2005 (compared with about 
80% share for real estate loans in the U.S.).  Presumably real estate backed loans are relatively 
transparent and thus amenable to purchase by a diffuse class of investors, in contrast to more 
opaque assets such as loans to businesses. 
[FIGURES 3 & 4 HERE] 
Like securitization, loan sales and syndication have also grown rapidly over time.  Figure 
3 reports the share of total bank loans plus undrawn commitments to businesses that were 
syndicated over the past 15 years, and Figure 4 reports the growing volume of trade in secondary 
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markets for syndicated loans.  The share of loans that are syndicated grew rapidly until 2001, 
reaching more than 75% of total loan commitments.  Since that time, this share has fallen as non-
bank lenders began to enter aggressively into the syndicated lending market.  Much of this entry 
occurred in secondary market transactions in which banks sold participation in syndicated loans 
to non-bank institutional investors (Ivashina and Sun, 2007;  Nandy and Shao, 2007).  As Figure 
4 shows, volume of trading in secondary markets has risen in step with the growth in the 
syndicated lending market itself. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Banks provide both funding liquidity and market liquidity in various ways.  Some of 
these liquidity-producing activities are unique to banking (or are dominated by banks), such as 
holding deposits and issuing lines of credit.  Others are similar to liquidity provision by non-bank 
intermediaries like investment banks.  For example, both securitization and loan syndication 
share features in common with bond underwriting.  The differences are related to the greater 
information asymmetry and incentive problems – in the case of bond and equity underwriting, 
investment banks sell all of an issuance to arm’s length investors; in securitization and 
syndication, only a portion of the funding comes at arm’s length.  Moreover, both commercial as 
well as investment banks and unregulated finance companies are active securitizers.  Both 
investment banks and large commercial banks also make markets in over-the-counter derivatives 
such as interest rate swaps and foreign exchange, which enhance market liquidity of those assets.  
In general, market liquidity production is something that is not unique to banking. 
What is different about commercial banks, what distinguishes them from other 
intermediaries, are products like checkable deposits and loan commitments.  These products 
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supply funding liquidity to customers; they offer cash on demand.  Banks ‘special role’ lies 
mainly in providing this funding liquidity, but their day-to-day business has increasingly 
involved provision of market liquidity as a consequence of the growth and deepening of 
securities markets.  This changing role can be seen in the evolution of syndicated lending, where 
banks typically continue to dominate in the market for credit lines, in both the primary and 
secondary markets (Gatev and Strahan, 2008).  In contrast, non-bank institutional investors play 
an important role in term lending in the syndicated market. 
[FIGURE 5 HERE] 
Looking ahead, banks will likely continue to provide liquidity in both dimensions, but the 
traditional asset transformation role of banks – holding loans financed with liquid deposits – 
seems to be on the wane.  The growth of capital markets simply offers many cheaper ways to 
finance loans, and technology has reduced the amount of financing available to banks in running 
the payments system.  Figure 5 reports the share of total private credit from banks for the median 
developed country and the median developing country.  Banks’ share of credit is consistently 
higher in the developed countries, but in both groups the trend away from banks and toward 
markets is clear and inexorable.  These trends do not imply that ‘banks are dead’, or even dying.  
Much of the growth in securities markets has happened because banks provide both back-up 
liquidity support and credit enhancement to allow otherwise illiquid assets to receive most of 
their funding at arm’s length.
Figure 1: Bank Liquidity Production to GDP
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Securitization of Loans in the US Economy 
 
The Figure presents the percentage of loans securitized relative to total loans outstanding for six categories of loans: (i) home mortgages, (ii) multifamily residential mortgages, 
(iii) commercial mortgages, (iv) consumer credit, (v) business loans, and (vi) farm mortgages. The data are from Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States. 
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Total
Securitization Annual Total
Year (€ million) Growth Rate Collateral (€ million) Share
2000 78.2 - Auto Loans 4.1 1.3%
2001 152.6 95.1% Credit Card 11.7 3.6%
2002 157.7 3.3% CDOs 48.9 15.0%
2003 217.3 37.8% Commercial Mortgages 38.6 11.8%
2004 243.5 12.1% Loans & Leases 55.1 16.9%
2005 327.0 34.3% Residential Mortgages 144.9 44.3%
2006 458.9 40.3% Other 23.7 7.2%
Total 327.0 100.0%
Sources: Thomson Financial, Dealogic, JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch, Structured Finance International, Bloomberg
Table 1: Securitization and Residential Mortgage Markets in Europe
2005 Securitization by Collateral
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